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One burning issue arising out of the Brexit process was the con-
stitutional question about how the British government could initi-
ate formal withdrawal from the European Union. Ruling in the case
brought by investment manager Gina Miller (Miller v Secretary of
State for Exiting the EU) on 7 November 2016, the High Court
declared that the government could not trigger Article 50 without
an Act of Parliament. The UK Supreme Court upheld this decision
on 24 January 2017. The controversy around this high-profile legal
challenge brought many of the latent tensions in post-EU Referen-
dum Britain to the surface. Both court cases sparked dramatic
media responses, with reactions in the popular press described
as ‘‘outrageous” and ‘‘a toxic mix of bigotry and unsubtle hints of
violence” (Barber and King, 2016). In particular, the Daily Mail’s
front page lead under the headline ‘‘Enemies of the people”, bla-
zoned across a page carrying photographs of the three High Court
judges who heard the initial case, came in for harsh criticism in
other UK newspapers and earned the Daily Mail over 1000 com-
plaints to the newspaper watchdog IPSO.
To exacerbate matters, around the time of the hearings both
Gina Miller herself and the judges involved were subjected to vit-
riolic personal attacks. The Daily Mail, again, was particularly viru-
lent, not only in its attacks on Miller, but also in denigrating the
judges on both personal and professional grounds. Importantly,
the issues were framed by the Daily Mail as politically motivated:
Miller wanted to undermine the referendum result, hamper
arrangements for Brexit, and thereby attack democracy, while
the judges were colluding with this ‘‘attack on democracy” by pro-
nouncing judgment in her favour. By contrast, from a legal per-
spective, the issues involved in the court cases were relatively
clear and the rulings were perfectly consistent with standard con-
stitutional theory. Indeed, some leading lawyers commented that
‘‘the most surprising thing about the decision (. . .) is that so many
people have found the decision surprising” (Barber and King,
2016). Far from attacking democracy, the legal view was that the
hearings were designed to uphold democracy and ensure that cor-
rect constitutional procedures were followed. There was mani-
festly a huge rift between the view of this case presented in the
popular press and the legal understanding of it in the courtrooms,
which is problematic because, in the words of Lord Neuberger,president of the Supreme Court during the appeal (BBC News,
2017), ‘‘The rule of law together with democracy is one of the
two pillars on which our society is based. . . and therefore if, with-
out good reason, the media or anyone else undermines the judi-
ciary that risks undermining our society.”
The Miller case and its repercussions thus constitute a critical
event in post-referendum British politics. Within this, the Daily
Mail’s reporting on this issue has a significant role. The Daily Mail,
launched in 1896 as Britain’s first popular daily, is famous for its
campaigning stance (Bingham and Conboy, 2015). In recent years
it has gained notoriety for its xenophobic and Eurosceptic politics
(Henderson et al., 2016). Although its ‘‘vigorously anti-European
agenda” is shared with other newspapers, most notably the Mur-
doch group (Sun, Times) and the Daily Telegraph (Daddow, 2012),
the Daily Mail played a particularly outspoken campaigning role
during the EU Referendum, to the extent that Henderson et al.
describe it in this context as ‘‘Britain’s most influential newspa-
per. . . the authentic voice of ‘middle England’” (2016: 187).
Regarding the Miller case, not only did the Mail offer the most
extreme instances of side-taking and hostility, but as Freeden
(2017: 7) notes, it also set a tone that was to be echoed in other
media, triggering a process of ‘‘linguistic and ideological seepage”
that even influenced government ministers and other significant
spokespeople. Moreover, as the Daily Mail was, after the Sun, the
UK newspaper with by far the largest circulation during the Brexit
campaign and aftermath (daily sales averaging just over 1.5 million
during the years 2015–2017, compared to 400,000 for the Times),
its potential influence was considerable.
The present article therefore takes the Daily Mail’s reporting on
the legal challenge to triggering Article 50 as a case study on pro-
Brexit media discourses in the aftermath of the EU Referendum.
My account is based on two premises: first, that discourse is cen-
tral to any study of the media, and second, that the impetus behind
the ongoing Brexit campaign can best be understood in terms of
(media and political) populism. Regarding the first point, it is
widely accepted that social and cultural movements in contempo-
rary society exist as discourses, as well as in extra-discursive
trends that run parallel to these (Fairclough and Chouliaraki,
2005: 4). Discourses are here understood as context-dependent
semiotic practices which are both ‘‘socially constituted and socially
constitutive” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 89), that is, they are
conditioned by social structures and relations, but they also have
an ongoing effect on the way these structures and relations are
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gies are deployed, for example, in representing social actors in par-
ticular ways that reflect underlying ideological frameworks (van
Leeuwen, 2008). These representations in turn condition future
social actions and interactions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009) – a pro-
cess in which the media have a key role (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak,
2015). By critically examining newspaper discourses, we can come
to a deeper understanding of the underlying representations being
adopted and propagated around particular issues in broad sectors
of society at a particular time (Wodak, 2015: 50-54).
The second basis for my analysis is located in the literature on
populist discourse, which provides a grounding for analysing these
discursive strategies in a broader perspective (Taggart, 2000;
Mudde, 2004). Both tabloid newspapers and the Brexit campaign-
ers have been classified as having a ‘‘populist” style of communica-
tion (Conboy, 2006; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015), inviting an
exploration of how political and media discourses overlap in par-
ticular cases. My approach to populism is based on Moffitt
(Moffitt and Tormey, 2013; Moffitt, 2016), who builds on Laclau
(2005) and Mudde (2007), to examine the common ground
between populist politicians in 30 different contexts, identifying
key features of their self-presentation and performance that cut
across traditional political dividing lines such as right and left.
These features constitute what he terms the ‘‘populist style”. Pre-
dictably, they include the need for strong identification with a
homogeneous ‘‘people” (inevitably only representing one part of
the real people of a country, but presented as an indivisible unity)
(Taggart, 2000). However, populist performances also involve
strategies for widening the discursive divide between the people
and its enemies or adversaries (who are both denigrated and dele-
gitimised). Moffitt (2015, 2016) also emphasises the imperative
need to generate and perform a sense of crisis, often through highly
emotive discourses, and to perpetuate this crisis for as long as pos-
sible. This sense of crisis acts as a crucial mechanism to legitimise
drastic action against the people’s ‘‘enemies”. This understanding
of populism sheds light on current political trends, but is also help-
ful for the analysis of media texts.
The present paper asks how the Daily Mail presentsMiller v Sec-
retary of State for Exiting the EU, focusing on the representation of
social actors including ‘‘the people” and its ‘‘enemies”. The patterns
that emerge are interpreted in terms of populist discourse (Moffitt,
2016), showing how the populist style enters into a productive
synergy with the sensationalising discourses of the tabloid press
(Conboy, 2006; Johansson, 2008), generating powerful persuasive
effects.Table 1
Frequency of main individual and collective actors (raw frequency).
Individual actors Collective actors
(Gina) Miller 104 Government 112
(Theresa) May 58 Judges 79
(Jon) Maguire 25 MPs 83
(Jeremy) Corbyn 20 Parliament 91
(Lord) Neuberger 12 People 87
(David) Davis 12 Lawyers 50
(Charlie) Mullins 10 Remainers 22 (Remoaners 4)
(Deir Dos) Santos 10 Ministers 20
(David) Pannick 9 Judiciary 19
(Michael) Gove 7 Brexiteers 72. Texts and methodology
The texts for this study were selected using Lexis Nexis to
include all the available articles from the print versions of the Daily
Mail and Mail on Sunday concerning the two court cases launched
by Gina Miller concerning the mechanism by which Article 50
should be triggered. The search was set to begin on 14 October
2016, when Miller’s intention to start legal action was made public,
and to end four months later, three weeks after the Supreme Court
delivered judgment on 24 January 2017. This sample of texts can
thus be considered representative of the way this issue was repre-
sented to Daily Mail readers over the crucial period in which the
case was being decided, first in the High Court, then in the
Supreme Court, and the immediate aftermath of the decision. The
initial search yielded 68 texts, but after duplicates and mere men-
tions had been eliminated, a final set of 38 texts was compiled,
consisting of around 30,000 words. Regarding analysis, a qualita-
tive approach was adopted (Fairclough, 2003): the texts were read
and re-read to identify themes of interest, then instances of eachtheme were compiled and compared. In parallel to this, some rel-
evant quantitative data were extracted using the SketchEngine cor-
pus linguistics platform in order to validate the qualitative findings
(Partington, 2004). For the purpose of triangulation, comparisons
were also made with corpora compiled from other UK newspapers
(Times, Guardian, Daily Telegraph, FT, Daily Mirror) in the same time
span using the same search criteria, but a detailed analysis of these
comparable corpora falls beyond the scope of the present paper.
In what follows, my analysis begins with the representation of
social actors as individuals or groups, and the way these are habit-
ually categorised, since this is crucial in the ideological underpin-
ning of any discourse (van Leeuwen, 2008). I therefore first look
at the main (individual or collective) actors in the case and the
way they are portrayed by the newspaper reports. Among the col-
lective actors, I devote special attention to the way in which ‘‘the
people” is represented in relation to other protagonists. Particular
analysis centres on the way divisions are opened and widened dis-
cursively, and the way that a sense of ongoing crisis is generated,
which, I argue, is crucial to understand the functioning of populist
discourses of this kind. Where appropriate, the qualitative analysis
is complemented by quantitative data. In my conclusions, I relate
these findings to theories of populist performance, and populist
discourse in the media.
3. Main actors in the news reports
To set the scene for the qualitative analysis, it is important to
have an overview of who the main actors in these texts are, and
how often each is mentioned. A distinction must be made between
whether people are identified as individuals, or whether they are
referred to as groups, in what van Leeuwen terms processes of
‘‘collectivisation” and ‘‘assimilation”, which anchor certain collec-
tives as players with homogeneous interests and ideas (2008:
37–38). Table 1 provides an overview of the frequency with which
individual actors in the case were named, and the number of refer-
ences to collectives (‘‘the government”, ‘‘ministers”, etc.).
As Table 1 shows, the main named protagonists in the reports
were Gina Miller and the Prime Minister (May), followed by one
of Miller’s former husbands (Maguire), the leader of the opposition
(Corbyn), the president of the Supreme Court (Neuberger), and the
Minister for Exiting the European Union (Davis). Of the individuals
with roles in the text, Prime Minister May is generally treated as a
neutral actor, the subject of verbs of saying and the object of verbs
such as ‘‘stop” or ‘‘force”. Davis and Gove are also presented as neu-
tral sayers and doers. Corbyn and Pannick, on the other hand, are
represented more colourfully (Corbyn is ‘‘embattled” and has an
‘‘appalling relationship with his own party”, Pannick has ‘‘two
creamy dimples in his cheeks”).
Regarding the collectives mentioned, they are generally classi-
fied in terms of professional/functional roles (van Leeuwen,
2008: 40-41), reinforcing the sense of a society made up of fixed,
confrontational blocs. The frequent mention of institutions such
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that the case centred on the different constitutional roles of gov-
ernment and parliament. Here, ‘‘government”, ‘‘parliament” and
‘‘ministers” are treated as neutral actors, without qualifying adjec-
tives or descriptions. It is also logical that ‘‘judges”, ‘‘the judiciary”
and ‘‘lawyers” should have a major role, but it is interesting that
these collectives, unlike the political ones, are often associated
with evaluative language (‘‘lofty judges”, ‘‘unelected judiciary”,
‘‘unscrupulous lawyers”). ‘‘Remainers”, unsurprisingly, are the
group which comes in for the most fire, as will be discussed later
on. The frequency of ‘‘people” is particularly interesting in this sce-
nario, and this topic forms the subject of a special section below.
In the following subsections, I examine the representation of
the main players in the case, starting with individuals, and then
moving on to collective actors.
3.1. Gina Miller: Misogyny and resentment
The most striking strategy for discrediting the main participants
in the legal challenge was by personal abuse. Within this, Gina
Miller herself comes in for the largest number of different attacks
in the Daily Mail. Apart from the Prime Minister, she is the only
high-profile woman associated with the case (the judges and other
main campaigners were all men), and it is noticeable that there is a
strong tendency for Daily Mail writers to refer to her gendered
identity. By way of contrast, reporting on Theresa May contains
only one gendered representation, and this is in a comparison with
Gina Miller (we are told that Miller, ‘‘like Theresa May”, ‘‘has a pen-
chant for leopard prints”).
Most notably in this, Gina Miller is repeatedly referred to in
both news and opinion articles as ‘‘former model”, ‘‘ex-model
who is the face of Remain”, a label that is hardly apposite when
we consider it as a way of referring to someone who is a successful
investment manager and has led various campaigns to improve
transparency in the city (Masters, 2016). Significantly, in other
newspapers, the term ‘‘model” only appears very infrequently (5
times in the Times, 3 times in the Guardian, twice in the Daily Tele-
graph, once in the FT). The label ‘‘model” itself engages sexist atti-
tudes in which women are valued for their appearance rather than
any other quality. ‘‘Former model” compounds this, by suggesting
that she is living off her earlier good looks. From the other bio-
graphical details sketched in by the Daily Mail in its news reports
(her husband ‘‘tennis-loving Alan”, and her former husbands, her
divorces, her children, her lifestyle), the picture emerges of a
woman who has made her career from looks and relationships
rather than any more intellectual quality. The high frequency of
relational identifications (van Leeuwen, 2008: 43) presenting her
in terms of personal kinship relations is striking: although popular
newspapers often adopt this approach to reporting, perhaps in an
attempt to engage human interest (Johansson, 2008), its effect here
seems to be to trivialise rather than to elicit sympathy. According
to one Daily Mail news story, Miller is ‘‘glamorous, feisty and
well-connected”, while a feature article introduces her by saying
there is ‘‘a whiff of the Jackie Collins heroine about her”. These allu-
sions draw upon the frame of the woman who has got to the top by
means other than professional merit, undermining any notion that
her legal claims are serious and solidly grounded. If there were any
lingering doubt about her seriousness, her motivation for launch-
ing the court case is explained several times in terms of an over-
sized ego, rather than any concern for legality: Miller is simply
‘‘an egomaniac” who ‘‘always wanted the limelight”.
The second set of negative attributes applied to Miller, which
again finds echoes in descriptions of other people involved in the
case, was the idea that she is ‘‘not from here”. Although Miller
holds a UK passport, many of the articles contain phrases that shed
doubt on her Britishness, her allegiance to the United Kingdom, orher ability to share the feelings of British people. Several times, in
both news and comment, she is referred to as ‘‘foreign born” or
‘‘Guyana born”, or simply ‘‘not from this country”. These seemingly
casual comments convey a high exclusionary force through impli-
cature (cf. Wodak, 2015: 50). Miller’s place of birth is used to dele-
gitimise her as a spokesperson for British people, and therefore as a
campaigner to clarify an issue of UK constitutional importance.
These discourses are carefully modulated, however, in order to
pre-empt accusations of outright racism (Wodak, 2015: 58-60).
For example, the derogatory epithet ‘‘the black widow spider”, sup-
posedly used by disgruntled investment managers who opposed
her campaign for transparency in the City, is highlighted, but care-
fully attributed to her critics in the financial world.
Finally, the most important shared strand in Miller’s negative
presentation is constructed around her status as member of a priv-
ileged social group: columnists habitually label her as a ‘‘pushy
posh mum”, a ‘‘multi-millionaire businesswoman”, a ‘‘city slicker”
who lives in a ‘‘£7 million house in Chelsea”, and is ‘‘bankrolled by
hedge-fund fat cats”. Miller’s fortune, lifestyle, and status as ‘‘for-
mer model” are important in establishing her as the kind of celeb-
rity that tabloid newspapers love to write about with their
characteristic blend of admiration and contempt (Conboy, 2006;
Johansson, 2008). For example, in several of the articles in this cor-
pus Miller is quoted complaining about some rather serious attacks
that she has suffered. But the writer maintains the tongue-in-cheek
stance familiar in the tabloid press, in which celebrities of various
kinds who suffer minor misfortunes are held up for ridicule
(Conboy, 2006; Breeze, 2010): the attitude of Schadenfreude in
which the tabloid press both uses celebrities to attract readers,
then laughs at them, thereby cultivating fellow-feeling with read-
ers and producing what Johansson identifies as a trigger for ‘‘frus-
tration, enmity and anger” (2008: 408). As we shall see below, this
pattern of envy, scorn and rejection recurs in the references to
other Remain supporters, becoming part of a pervasive master
frame on Brexit propagated powerfully within the press.
3.2. The judges: ‘‘out of touch” and ‘‘activists”
The judges themselves – particularly the three High Court
judges – come in for a considerable amount of disparagement,
again focusing almost exclusively on non-legal issues. Three main
strands run through these negative representations: judges belong
to a social elite which is ‘‘out of touch” with ordinary people;
judges are lawyers (in itself, an untrustworthy profession), and as
such are paid vast sums of money out of public (tax-payers’) funds;
and judges are pro-European and are therefore plotting to frustrate
plans for Brexit. In all of these, allusion to their collective status as
members of a privileged group reinforces negative discursive
effects through assimilation (van Leeuwen, 2008: 37), lending
them cumulative force.
First, references to their membership of the establishment col-
our almost all the reports in which the High Court or Supreme
Court judges are mentioned. Sarcastically referred to as ‘‘lofty
judges”, ‘‘tough old birds” and ‘‘from almost identical rarefied
backgrounds”, they are presented as ‘‘out of touch” (this expression
is repeated 6 times with reference to judges) and therefore inap-
propriate to decide matters of importance to ‘‘the people”. Their
very status is undermined by hints of ‘‘cronyism” alleged in their
appointments, compounded by statements likely to discredit them
with Daily Mail readers, such as ‘‘from the same chambers as Tony
Blair”.
Secondly, frequent reference is made to their earnings, and
most particularly to fees charged to the state (for example, another
High Court judge is reported to have charged up to £619,000 a year
for his work for the Treasury, and to have ‘‘billed taxpayers more
than £3 million”). Moreover, the articles specifically reporting on
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highly lucrative cases, framed as an attack on the legal profession
in general: these accuse lawyers of ‘‘being consumed by a desire
to make barrow-loads of money in order to feather their own
nests”, and hint heavily at corruption, ‘‘ambulance chasing” and
sexual misconduct. The cloud of negative associations around law-
yers in general colours the representation of the judges, reinforcing
the process of alignment against them in the texts.
The last main accusation is held up as the worst, namely, ‘‘polit-
ical activism”. The High Court case is characterised, notoriously, as
‘‘a judicial coup to overturn the will of the people”: by implication,
the judgment is a product of the judges’ political opinion, and an
attempt to ‘‘thwart the will of the people”, rather than the outcome
of their consideration of constitutional issues. To sharpen these
attacks on judges as ‘‘activists”, a particular delegitimisation strat-
egy targeting the judges in the High Court and Supreme Court
operates through references to their supposed pro-EU sympathies.
Comment writer Quentin Letts calls them ‘‘gold-robed Pooh Bahs
of the Europhiliac judiciary”, implying ineffectual self-importance
combined with unhealthy EU sympathies. Lord Chief Justice John
Thomas is described as ‘‘a committed Europhile”. Even where little
material would seem to be available, irrelevant details are scat-
tered that might be intended to undermine readers’ sympathy for
the judges as a group or as individuals: one High Court judge is
oddly described as ‘‘openly gay”, and we are even supplied with
the trivial detail that Lord Neuberger’s sister-in-law had described
the Leave campaign as ‘‘anti-immigrant”.
All three aspects tend to reinforce the classification of judges as
members of an untrustworthy, potentially hostile collective, so
that even when individual judges are named or described, the neg-
ative connotations associated with their individual activities else-
where attach to their collective representation here. The judiciary
in this sense takes on a degree of overdetermination in these texts
(van Leeuwen, 2008: 47-48): it represents a self-serving Establish-
ment, a privileged social class and a redoubt of pro-European sym-
pathies, offering an easy target for envy, resentment and
indignation (Moffitt, 2016).
3.3. Remainers: wealthy, ‘‘sour-faced” and ‘‘fanatical”
Supporters of the Remain campaign – homogeneously pre-
sented as a hard-line collective aligned with Miller and her sup-
porters – are invariably shown in a negative light: their
representation is coloured by a cluster of words again related to
the notions of being a privileged elite, on the one hand, and being
‘‘out of touch”, on the other. Discursive associations are thus built
between the Remainers and other out-groups, such as judges, add-
ing to the cumulative effects. Moreover, in political terms, this
entire group is represented collectively as being destructive and
totally lacking in scruples, at once undemocratic and self-seeking.
In fact, the Daily Mail’s reporting abounds with negative represen-
tations of politicians or public figures who opposed – or merely
failed to express enthusiasm about – Brexit. Opinion writers label
them ‘‘harbingers of doom”, ‘‘sour faced rent-a-gob Remainers”,
who utter ‘‘alarmist prophecies of impending economic collapse
and millions of lost jobs”, and subscribe to ‘‘Project Fear” (Hobolt,
2016).
In the case of public figures who expressed support for Miller,
the greatest scorn is reserved for those who are not resident in
the United Kingdom. Not only have they somehow betrayed Britain
by leaving, they are now trying to frustrate ‘‘the will of the people”,
and are thus guilty of a kind of double treachery. Wealthy Remain-
ers outside the United Kingdom ‘‘rage and tut and moan and plot
against the Euroscepticism of those voters back home in Britain”.
For example, Richard Branson is denigrated for supporting the legal
challenge while living abroad. We read of ‘‘Sir Richard and his sun-bleached coterie” who are hoping to sabotage the referendum
result by supporting Miller’s case. Branson’s credibility is discur-
sively undermined by his portrayal as ‘‘a billionaire who chooses
to live half a world away”. On another occasion, a columnist asks
of the group UK-EU Open Policy Limited, ‘‘are they as detached
from the true concerns of the British electorate as their champion
and financial backer Sir Richard is, physically, from our island’s fog-
bound shores?” Moreover, these opponents of Brexit are, by the
Daily Mail’s definition, also ‘‘unpatriotic”. Of course, their absence
from Britain in itself makes them disloyal and untrustworthy.
But to make matters worse, ‘‘rich and powerful anti-Brexiteers”
are accused of wanting Britain to fail – and as the Mail informs
us ‘‘there is a word for this sort of behaviour and it is not patrio-
tism”. In all this, it is important to note that both Miller and her
supporters are jointly stigmatised for being rich and privileged.
They live in a ‘‘fortress of privilege”, inhabiting ‘‘VIP clubs” and
‘‘palm-fringed islands”. Resentment is a powerful emotion, and
the notion that others are not only doing better than oneself, but
actively seeking to keep it that way by underhand means, is highly
inflammatory.
Generally speaking, then, those who voted to stay in the EU are
characterised as bad losers and moaners, on the one hand, and as
unpatriotic conspirators, on the other. There is a strong tendency
to lump these individuals together in a process of collectivisation
and assimilation (van Leeuwen, 2008), with ongoing consequences
for the political landscape of post-referendum Britain. Running
through all of this is a strong strand of resentment, generated
around envy of people who are wealthier and live in a better cli-
mate. Again, these representations are coloured by the characteris-
tic blend of admiration, envy and disparagement used in the
tabloid representation of celebrities (Johansson, 2008; Breeze,
2010). Crucially, though, this weapon is given a sharper edge by
the suggestion that these very individuals are determined to pre-
vent ordinary people from getting what they voted for. On this last
point, one interpretation of the Miller case offered by commentator
Quentin Letts is that: ‘‘Hard core Remainers (. . .) are using the law
to try to sow confusion and create inertia, thus defying the British
people who surely have more right to see their political will
enacted”. The notion of a conspiracy, of ‘‘special interests” and
betrayal by those in power has been a leitmotif of recent populist
movements (Mudde, 2004), and it is frequently mobilised here
against Remain supporters.
Importantly, this insistence on the ‘‘elite” reflects what previous
researchers have reported about populist discourses in other coun-
tries: for example, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), examining the
Dutch context, found that representations of ‘‘elites” and ‘‘be-
trayal” were a more consistent identifying feature of populist dis-
courses than more obvious aspects such as references to ‘‘the
people”. In Moffitt’s analysis (2016), the projection of an enemy
is closely related to the generation of a sense of crisis, and both
together are highly characteristic of the ‘‘populist style”. This last
point is crucial, because it provides a clue to the way the sense
of crisis is fostered and the tension in society is raised by creating
the sense of a ‘‘conspiracy” against the ‘‘people”: remainers are ‘‘fa-
natical”, and will ‘‘resort to any means available, putrid propa-
ganda, parliamentary obstructionism, and now judicial activism
to keep Britain locked into the EU”.3.4. Giving voice to the people
The concept of ‘‘the people” is, of course, central to Brexit dis-
courses and central to populism. Here, the word ‘‘people” occurs
87 times (normalised to 2584 per million words, making it strik-
ingly more frequent than, say, in the comparable FT corpus, (893/
million), or in the entire BNC corpus (1097/million)). Significantly,
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some potential ideological loading.
First, 31 of these occur in the combination ‘‘the people”, reflect-
ing van Leeuwen’s homogeneous collective (2008: 37), projecting a
unitary entity of the kind that Taggart (2000) and Jagers and
Walgrave (2007) show to be typical of populist discourse, which
habitually envisages ‘‘the people” as a homogeneous, unified entity
(in contrast to other political traditions that prefer to consider
social segments or interest groups such as ‘‘the workers”, ‘‘the
elderly”, ‘‘young people”, etc.). Importantly, fifteen of these occur-
rences appear in the expression ‘‘will of the people”. The examples
in Fig. 1 illustrate how ‘‘will of the people” here is treated as an
absolute category: the Referendum result (despite a vote of
48.11% for Remain) is taken to embody the ‘‘will of the people”
in an absolute, non-negotiable sense. Elsewhere it is paraphrased
as ‘‘the plain will of the majority”, ‘‘the will of the electorate”
and ‘‘the will of the British public”. It is perhaps also interesting
to note that the Daily Mail never uses quotation marks to prob-
lematize this concept, as is the case in other newspapers consulted
(for example, the expression ‘‘the will of the people” occurs 26
times in the Guardian’s reports on this case, but in the overwhelm-
ing majority of these instances it is quoted without alignment, or
problematised in some way; in the Daily Telegraph, of 11 instances,
7 are either quoted or problematised).
The recent rise to prominence of this concept in UK political dis-
course could itself form the subject of a deeper analysis. As Mudde
(2016: 26) has discussed, the notion of politics as an expression of
‘‘the general will” of the people remained on the margins of main-
stream European politics through most of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, but has gained currency in recent years, per-
haps in reaction to profound social changes that can variously be
ascribed to globalisation, neoliberalism or the rise of transnational
entities, and which leave large sectors of the electorate feeling
alienated or ignored. The evidence from these texts suggests that
this is currently an operative concept in Britain thanks to the EU
Referendum: many commentators here and elsewhere hold up
‘‘the will of the people” to be a true embodiment of the (simple,It is the Remainers, not the Leavers, who appear to have bee
In so doing, they've handed a weapon to Remoaners in both Hou
delaying Brexit or w
attempts to thwart the will of the people or frustrate or
Now Parliament must deliver the will of the people - we
CHILLING ANALYSIS OF WHAT COULD UNFOLD IF BRIT
BREX
The logic of the referendum is that it expresses the 
DON'T DISMISS WILL
an attempt to ignore the pop
critics of the three judges' ruling said they had s
Despite claiming he believes the will
Judges know nothing of t
Just imagine if the referendum had gone the other way and the Leave
of the people . There'd b
nobody should be allowed to th
pitting Parliament against
Fig. 1. Key concordance lines: ‘‘the will of thunitary) popular will that brooks no denial – and which endows
those who claim to act in its name with full authority and
legitimacy.
‘‘The British people” also occurs with relative frequency (18
times), and is treated as a single entity with one will and one voice.
We are told in no uncertain terms by the Mail’s political commen-
tator of the year that ‘‘the British people have made their decision”
and that ‘‘the British people gave a clear mandate for the UK gov-
ernment to leave the EU”. Moreover, we find verbs such as ‘‘per-
suade/defy/impose on” used with ‘‘the British people” as their
object, again supposing single agency: ‘‘the British people” is under
threat and may yet be defeated. This homogeneous, collective rep-
resentation of the people of a country through assimilation (van
Leeuwen, 2008: 37) is clearly aligned with classic populist dis-
courses (Taggart, 2000), in which a strong bond is assumed
between the people and those who claim to speak for them.
It is important to note that even unqualified instances of the
word ‘‘people” in these texts almost invariably offer some degree
of ideological alignment. Unsurprisingly, many mentions of ‘‘peo-
ple” are directly linked to the referendum vote. But many other
examples, though apparently unrelated to the referendum, offer
supporting ideological alignments pitting an indeterminate ‘‘peo-
ple” (van Leeuwen, 2008: 40) against members of the Establish-
ment, particularly (in this case) lawyers. For example, we read
that ‘‘ambulance-chasing lawyers have induced people to mount
or fight cases they would not otherwise have accepted”, placing
‘‘people” as the gullible victims of lawyers. Moreover, reports are
cited in which ‘‘people ranked [lawyers] lower than any other pro-
fession”. Of course, the logical extension of this is to align ‘‘the peo-
ple” against the judges in the case, a point which is also hammered
home in various instances.
We can also observe a highly emotive framing of ‘‘ordinary peo-
ple” as the undervaluedmasses whose suffering is implicitly attrib-
uted to the ‘‘liberal-minded elite” and thus to the EU: ‘‘you have
millions of people, many struggling to get by, who feel ignored, dis-
regarded, despised and abandoned”. Again, those who opposed
Brexit are credited with holding ‘‘the people” in low esteem:n attempting to defy the democratic will of the people . 
ses who are determined to frustrate the will of the people by 
atering it down. 
 delay the process of exiting the European Union. 
 will trigger A50 by end of March. Forward we go 
AIN'S ELITE DEFIES THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OVER 
IT 
will of the people , however narrowly decided. 
 OF THE PEOPLE 
ular will of the people 
et themselves against the will of the people 
 of the people must be respected, 
he will of the people 
 campaign had tried to stage a judicial coup to overturn the will 
e riots in the streets. 
wart the will of the people 
 the will of the people
e people” (capitals indicate headlines).
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has analysed, the tabloids habitually communicate through ‘‘a
close textual display of intimacy with idealized individual readers”
(2006: 10) in a kind of pact in which ‘‘the newspaper appears to
side with a populist chorus of condemnation of the ills of society”
(2006: 26). Once, the red rag of ‘‘political correctness”, another
theme in tabloid discourse (cf. Conboy, 2006) taken up by UKIP
and Eurosceptics (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015: 5) is brandished
in a way that courts solidarity with Mail readers: the common
sense of a judge who spoke up for the family is contrasted with
the values of ‘‘an increasingly progressive, politically correct judi-
ciary”. By siding with ‘‘the people” as a collective, and projecting
a sense of solidarity with indeterminate masses of people who
have supposedly been ‘‘left behind”, the newspaper here continues
its habitual pattern of ideological alignment in which ‘‘the British
people” is positioned as a chosen nation whose undeserved decline
can easily be attributed to disloyal and incompetent elites, political
correctness, and above all, the European Union (Conboy, 2006: 92).
Furthermore, the highly specific vision of democracy propagated
during the referendum campaign is perpetuated, so that Remain
supporters are credited with wanting to ‘‘surrender ever more
power to unelected bureaucrats and judges in Brussels”, and there-
fore with being anti-democratic, while Leave supporters (charac-
terised as very numerous, patriotic and hard working, but
‘‘ignored, despised and abandoned”) epitomise democratic values.
Finally, it is also important to note that an oppositional align-
ment is tentatively proposed here between ‘‘people” on one side,
and ‘‘politicians” on the other: one columnist tells us that ‘‘people
will lose faith in their politicians”. Conservative politician Iain Dun-
can Smith is quoted as saying that the Miller case has precipitated
‘‘a constitutional crisis literally pitting parliament against the will
of the people”. However, these direct and immediate textual
dichotomies are only the tip of the iceberg. Most of the texts are
constructed around a projected oppositional relationship between
‘‘the people” as a bloc, encompassing indeterminate instantiations
of ‘‘ordinary people”, aligned with the newspaper and its readers,
and, on the other side, ‘‘the elite” or ‘‘the Establishment”, repre-
sented by Miller, judges, Remain voters and pro-European figures,
who constitute a sinister constellation of privileged oppressors.3.5. Fostering a sense of crisis
One final strand running through the corpus concerns the
inflammatory representation of the Miller case as a ‘‘threat” to
Brexit. Although neither court case could in any sense have
stopped the activation of Article 50, the case was framed by the
Daily Mail as an attempt to ‘‘derail”, ‘‘water down” or ‘‘halt” the
process of leaving the EU: Miller and other Remainers want to
‘‘thwart the will of the people” by ‘‘betraying Brexit”. Importantly,
this is conveyed in the texts using strong, even catastrophic, lan-
guage with high emotional undertones: there is a ‘‘plot to sabotage
Brexit”, Miller wants to ‘‘throw a spanner in the works”, while the
judges’ decision is an ‘‘outrage”. This is sometimes presented in
such a way that readers are afforded a graphic description of mem-
bers of the privileged elite gloating about their successes: on one
occasion we are told that ‘‘Remain MPs boast about their plot to
halt Brexit”; while on another, we learn that David Pannick QC,
counsel for the claimants, is ‘‘beaming with self-pleasure” when
he finds that the judges have ruled in his favour. Such descriptions
of jubilant adversaries seem designed to infuriate the inscribed
pro-Brexit reader, sparking shock and indignation. As one Daily
Mail writer says, summing up the first Miller case, ‘‘No one could
have dreamed that Britain’s decision to leave the European Union
which 17.4 million people thought they had made at the ballot
box could be derailed by a rich financier and a mysterious Brazilianhairdresser, bankrolled by hedge fund fat cats and disgruntled
expats”.
Importantly, the vilification of this ‘‘elite” is emotionally fuelled
by the notion that the ‘‘elite” actually despises the ‘‘people”. We are
told that the elite think of the people as ‘‘moronic racists, too stu-
pid to understand the consequences of their decision”. As Hobolt
(2016: 1266) has pointed out, the Leave campaign itself sought
to frame the referendum as a battle between ordinary people
and the political establishment, in line with the populist idea of a
fundamental division. Here, in the Daily Mail, we see this theme
surfacing countless times. ‘‘The people” is pitted against the
‘‘Establishment” and against those who misuse power, squander
public money and favour immigrants over their ‘‘own people”
(Moffitt, 2016). The referendum vote is emphasised again and
again as epitomising ‘‘the will of the people”, and any protest
against the result is delegitimised by accusations that those who
voted Remain have a patronising and supercilious attitude to
‘‘the people”.
The sense of frustration generated through such reports finds its
counterpart in a more overtly aggressive type of language that
appears sporadically. One angry headline after the judgment reads
‘‘Now get out of Theresa’s way!” There are hints at ‘‘unimaginable
consequences” if anyone stops Brexit. Linked with the strong col-
lective identifications and emotional priming mentioned above
(pro-people, anti-elite), the combination of belligerent imperatives
and threats of appalling disasters serves to heighten the sense of
urgency, suggesting that swift action is needed to prevent the crisis
from worsening in some horrific but undefined way. The need to
convince people that there is a crisis, and to keep this crisis rum-
bling, is one of the hallmarks of populist discursive performance
(Moffitt, 2016), and one which matches very well with the sensa-
tionalist agenda of the tabloid press.4. Discussion
We have seen that the representation of social actors (individu-
als, but particularly groups) is crucial in the ideological underpin-
ning of the discourses surrounding the Miller case. The first aspect
of this to be discussed is the persistence of the classic British theme
of class struggle in these representations, but in its particular
Brexit-era configuration, which reinforces the emotional underpin-
ning of anti-European discourses and lends them political vigour.
The second is the association that emerges between the Daily Mail’s
discourses and broader societal and political trends.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these texts is the way a
dichotomy between different individual and collective social actors
is established, charged emotionally, and perpetuated, which both
draws on and reworks pre-existing representations of social cate-
gories. In the Daily Mail reports considered here, Gina Miller is both
disparaged as an individual, through repetition of dismissive rela-
tional and otherwise gendered representations (van Leeuwen,
2008), and identified as belonging to a dangerous collective. This
collective is fleshed out with an array of negative individual and
group projections of judges, lawyers, Remainers, and others. The
discursive processes of collectivisation and assimilation (van
Leeuwen, 2008) thus lead to the fixing of a hostile ‘‘Establishment”
consisting of rich and powerful EU sympathisers which is projected
as the ‘‘enemy of the people”: a ‘‘global liberal elite”, is ‘‘out of
touch” with ‘‘the people”, who are represented, for their part, as
numerous, needy, patriotic and loyal. This obviously reflects the
way the EU referendum campaign fanned the flames of Britain’s
legendary ‘‘class war”, an aspect that has been discussed in the lit-
erature (Hobolt, 2016). Although the lines were not drawn as pre-
dictably as one might imagine (certainly not in terms of purely
economic issues) the Leave campaign seems to have drawn its
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cess of globalisation (Matti and Zhou, 2016). The nature of the very
specific ‘‘losing out” envisaged by both UKIP and the Leave cam-
paign identified the UK’s ‘‘problems” as being caused by EU mem-
bership, but most particularly, by what these entities termed ‘‘free
movement of people” (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015: 87-103). The
message conveyed in earlier Conservative and UKIP discourses
(Wodak, 2015), stressed throughout the Leave campaign, and per-
petuated in much of the press after the referendum, was that Bri-
tish people’s lives (health care, education, employment
possibilities) were deterioriating because of an influx of ‘‘mi-
grants”, often ‘‘EU migrants”. This anti-immigrant message was
underpinned by frequent use of symbols of national identity and,
in the case of UKIP and some Conservative leaders, by obsessive
references to the armed forces and World War II (Shirbon, 2016;
Independent, 2017). In the Cameron years (Wodak, 2015: 81-88),
these issues came to be quilted together in a specific, somewhat
idiosyncratic, way. The perceived ‘‘poor conditions” of the less
affluent social classes were somehow attributed to EU migration
(cf. Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015: 309-312), and the current dysto-
pia came to be contrasted with an idealised vision of Britain before
EU entry as a cosy heartland (Taggart, 2000; Moffitt, 2016), with
hints of a glorious past battling victoriously against Europe. By
building up an anti-elite, anti-establishment discourse, the Daily
Mail both reflects and reproduces the Brexit dynamics, and rein-
forces entrenched collective identifications. Taking this point fur-
ther, we see that reporting on this issue is fully consonant with
the Daily Mail’s stance on Brexit-related issues (Daddow, 2012;
Freeden, 2017).
Taking a step back, we can see how the Brexit issue in general,
and the Miller case in particular, fit comfortably into the tabloid
master frame of greatness, decline and blame analysed so acutely
by Conboy ten years previously (2006). Moreover, the discursive
presentation of the issues coalesces perfectly with what (Conboy,
2006: 26) describes as the tabloids’ ‘‘ideological pact with readers”
in which their characteristic ‘‘textual display of intimacy” with
readers (2006: 10) reinforces their ideological alignment with
‘‘the people” against ‘‘the Establishment” and, crucially in this case,
against Miller. Here, the issues at stake are collapsed into a simple
clash of elite versus the people. Since the priming for this is already
present, the issues are simply telescoped, so that they can be repo-
sitioned in the Daily Mail’s worldview, and made compatible with
its assertions of popular and national solidarity, its unquestioning
loyalties and prejudices, its binary representations of good and evil,
its habit of framing political issues in terms of hyperbolic clashes of
personality, its stultifying but highly successful populist rhetoric of
common sense, and its overwhelming hegemonic identifications of
‘‘us” versus ‘‘them”. The master frame of nationalism, populism,
Euroscepticism and class warfare was already there in newspapers
such as the Daily Mail, and the Brexit campaign offered a perfect
match.
Lastly, there is no doubt that the Daily Mailwriters here, as else-
where, deploy discourses that exhibit the main features of populist
performance analysed by previous authors. ‘‘The people” mobilised
broadly as ‘‘an undividable unity” (Mudde, 2007) plays a signifi-
cant role, and writers cultivate ‘‘textual intimacy” with it
(Conboy. 2006), adopting a stance in which the newspaper claims
to share the people’s sufferings and champion the people against
the ‘‘elites” who do them down. Rather than considering Miller’s
campaign in terms of constitutional importance or legal conse-
quences, the writers consistently present campaigners, lawyers
and judges as the enemy, as having ‘‘values and behaviour [. . .]
irreconcilable with the people’s general interest” (Mudde, 2007).
Moreover, the stark emotional dichotomies established, between
privileged traitors, on the one hand, and suffering patriots, on the
other, serve to raise the affective temperature of the reports. Thisreflects the logic of the popular press, in which issues can always
be resolved through an appeal to supposedly universal human val-
ues on an affective level (Aldridge, 2003; Bingham and Conboy,
2015). Notably, however, it also incorporates the elements of sen-
sationalism, urgency and extremism that are conducive to per-
suading readers that there is a crisis, and that the ‘‘will of the
people” is going to be thwarted by enemies who are unscrupulous,
cunning and even non-British. The elements of division, popular
representation, emotion and crisis come together in these reports,
as the conventions and ideology of the right-wing tabloid newspa-
per merge with the interests of a populist political campaign. The
combination of highly emotive framing, scare-mongering and
aggressive language serves to heighten a sense of crisis. Although
this is especially characteristic of populist performances in the
political arena (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013; Moffitt, 2015), we can
observe here that the popular press generates similar spectacles,
propagating inflammatory discourses to attract readers. The match
is so close that it is tempting here to speak of a confluence of inter-
ests, in which populist discourses and sensationalising media flow
together in mutual enhancement. Here, the issues around the
Miller case and around Brexit merge into a productive symbiosis
with pre-existing populist tabloid discourses (Conboy, 2006;
Bingham and Conboy, 2015) creating a productive synergy.
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